1.05.2000

Tokyo Midterm Paper (Architecture in Tokugawa-Era Edo)

Interior and Exterior Space in Tokugawa-Era Edo

Authors William H. Coaldrake and Constantine N. Vaporis would have had a difficult time finding more distinct methods with which to survey the physical structure of Edo during the reign of the Tokugawa bakufu. Coaldrake applies a top-down view that focuses on those in a position to build and regulate architecture on an extensive or monumental scale and cites classical texts along with surviving period documents, while Vaporis offers an interpretation of a single, though unique, primary document chronicling a specific slice of life of domainal samurai. It may seem circuitous to approach architecture in pre-modern Edo by examining the analyses of authors such as Coaldrake and Vaporis in that they address the subject from dissimilar as well as somewhat limited viewpoints. However, if we trace the causality between the two it is possible to construct a more robust and meaningful conception of architecture and urban space in Tokugawa era Edo than would be possible by studying them separately.

Coaldrake’s Edo is one of exteriors, displays and decrees with special attention paid to the sources and channels of authority. The only types of individuals mentioned in Architecture and Authority in Japan and “Edo Architecture and Tokugawa Law” are those mandating construction or a more ancient variety used for reference. More regularly he only alludes to actual personages and represents them generally as a position of sovereignty from which policy emanates. He observes that, “inseparable from the notion of authority itself is the role of ‘power to influence the conduct and action of others’,”1 and posits monumental architecture and the organization of space, particularly urban space, as the foremost physical manifestations of this power. Equating historical civilization with its most notable edifices such as the Athenian Acropolis and dynastic China with the palace city of Beijing,2 Coaldrake demonstrates how architectural production is not only the privilege and responsibility of those in power, to rule is in essence to build and vice versa. So pervasive are these ideas that they infiltrate language to give form to abstract concepts such as authority and influence. Indeed, literal translations of classical Japanese words for sovereign are ‘honorable gateway’ and ‘below the palace steps’. It should seem to be no coincidence that in the Edo period the gateway and palace are two of the most significant constructions representing affluence and authority. Looking at the utilization of this kind of monumental architecture together with urban space in Edo, Coaldrake characterizes the, “mutually congruent traditions,”3 of architecture and law in this era and their gradual shift from the authoritative to the practical.

Through the spectacle of symbolic constructions and referential iconography, the, “structuring of spatial relations in which human activity takes place,”4 and the regulation of non-governmental building practice the Tokugawa bakufu is able to represent its own authority and enforce the new societal hierarchy from which its authority is drawn. Built nearly from scratch, Edo gave the bakufu opportunity to reintroduce older ideas of urban arrangement as well as formulate new ones. In this first aspect Coaldrake describes the use of Edo itself as a symbol of Tokugawa hegemony and referencing maps of early Edo he finds geomantic allusions to Heian-kyo and earlier Chinese capitals. Powerful religious and courtly tradition make the gateway a deeply rooted indication of Japanese identity and the bakufu intuitively use the gateway as, “the most visible representation of status in their political order,”5 though the implementation of which changes drastically over time as discussed below. Growing out of the tradition of medieval castle towns rather than courtly capitals, though, the innovative spiral layout of Edo betrayed the consideration of defense in urban planning as well as facilitating social stratification in the most literal, spatial sense. Delineated through edicts informing strict segregation of the class strata together with an extensive gate system, the implementation of this hierarchy was perhaps the apex of harmony in Tokugawa law and architecture. The lingering influence of martial tradition is also present in how the tenshu, or castle keep, “assumed new authority as the symbolic centre of the governing order,”6 and indeed Edo’s tenshu was the largest ever built.

Far from a purely symbolic capital, however, Edo was the, “key instrument for the imposition and maintenance of bakufu control over the daimyo,”7 its mechanism hinging on sankin kotai, or the alternate attendance system that situated the capital city as the hub. This institution of this policy reinforces the subjugation of the daimyo and at the same time influences the tremendous growth of Edo, not only by bringing them into the capital every other year but also through the conscription of the daimyo for the construction of most of the city including Edo castle, their mansions and ceremonial gateways. This second aspect effectively drained the daimyo of resources and indicated their subordination to the bakufu, with sumptuary laws codifying authorized architecture and architecture that overstepped boundaries of appropriate status.

On the other hand the Tokugawa bakufu did have to compromise its authority with ephemerality, a recurrent theme in Japanese thought. The most dramatic catalyst of this is the Meireki fire of 1657, the aftermath of which brought significant policy change and, “signalled an end to the age of architectural grandeur,”8 as well as innovative congruence between law and architecture. Reconstruction in the wake of Meireki also demonstrated the altered disposition of authority through time; though Edo castle had already been rebuilt several times, authority by this time lay in the hands of a few powerful daimyo making the symbol of shogunal dominance anachronistic, and its reconstruction was ultimately abandoned. Tiling of roofs was also banned in order to promote reconstruction and the exclusive lift of the ban for daimyo in 1660 was, “an obvious move in view of the deep association of tiling with power and prestige, but totally irresponsible in terms of the safety of Edo citizens.”9 Various, and largely ineffective, other measures were prescribed for fire prevention until 1720 in likely the most ostensible example of discord between political concern and practical necessity, especially in contrast with more pragmatic remedies such as the widening of streets and relocation of temples, shrines, and daimyo estates further from Edo castle. Subsequently the ‘arbitrary will’ of authority became continually more accommodating of structural convention, as fire never ceased to be a devastating force in Edo and the maintenance of monumental forms could only be conducted in relation to the practicality of doing so. Coaldrake provides an example of this evolution in the architectural development of mon bansho, or gateway guardhouses. Prompted once again by fire, a 1772 edict considerably de-emphasized the size and embellishment of the gateways themselves and effectively, “promoted the bansho to symbolic significance.”10 This standardization of the style of status-demonstrative architecture was in effect not to curtail but to, “preserve the dignity of daimyo,”11 during economic stricture.

If in Coaldrake’s investigations we discover the ideological cost of preserving the sankin kotai system with its inherent social division, review of Vaporis’ article “A Tour of Duty: Kurume Hanshi Edo Kinban Nagaya Emaki” makes apparent the human cost of this program. Vaporis’ investigation is restricted somewhat chronologically by the principal consideration of only a single documentary source and thematically by the subject therein, but through the placement of the paintings and accompanying scroll in a larger physical and historical framework as a preface to the document itself we obtain a more complete view of the interior relationship of domainal retainers and the surrounding architecture.

The paintings depict a composite of daily life within a daimyo compound roughly between 1839 and 1840, though it is evident that the accompanying text at least was created decades later in the reference to the former rather than present domain of Kurume. This could account for the intermingling of nostalgia and tedium in the tone of the writing. Those depicted are Edo kinban mono, retainers on duty in Edo, of a fairly large domain of 210,00 koku and thus have considerable status but also trivial authority over their own lives within the sankin kotai system. It is their duty to stay with their lord in Kurume as well as during his time in Edo, and his fortunes, or misfortunes, are theirs. Some of the effects of sankin kotai on retainers can be drawn from a letter written by a retainer of the Tosa domain to his lord who was protracting his return to the provinces. Bound to both their provincial home and their lord in Edo they are able to lead neither normal married lives or sever their ties, resulting in lives that are in essence put on hold while on duty in Edo. Permitted leave only several times a month, excluding official errands, retainers of daimyo in Edo found themselves confined primarily to the domainal estate. Within that limitation they were able to actively engage in culture through a multitude of intellectual, educational and martial activities, though the monotonous tenor of domainal life is palpable. It is important to recall the events of April 5, 1839 as the circumstances effecting painting 11: The daimyo Arima Yorinori is denied routine leave back to the Kurume domain and ordered to stay on in Edo for two more years, necessitating that his retainers also remain in Edo. This backdrop that Vaporis provides works to logically frame the account but performs mainly as a preface to the essence of the document itself.

While the literary value of the text accompanying the paintings may be negligent it does imbue the paintings with a certain sentimental quality by juxtaposing the pleasures of life in Edo with its hardships and also elaborates on the retainer’s interactions with space. Recalling the view from the barracks he places the account clearly as one on the inside looking out. This is especially true in his description of his own garden, upon which he gazes in painting 3. Surrogate of the natural enjoyment of the provincial sphere, Toda employs a more urban temperament in tending his garden. Arranged seashells invoke the shore and a miniature landscape along with small trees allows him to escape to a daydream of remote mountains. Also included in the text are poems authored by various retainers of this domain and the repeated theme of coolness lends a sensory dimension to the paintings.

Already unique in their rendering of the perspective of interior space, these are the, “only paintings to depict the living quarters of domainal samurai in Edo,”12 The depiction of and interaction with interior architectural space characterizes the series thematically as confining and monotonous and highlights the difference of harmony and disharmony within that space. The first way this is accomplished is the use of a perspective distinct from painting tradition of this era. Positioned on the inside looking out in all but one of the paintings this standpoint emphasizes the enclosing nature of the space itself and the authority that binds them to the space. Double layering is also cleverly used in four of the prints alternately blocking in or opening up the space whether they are down or up. In two of these instances an extended garden is positioned behind the flap while the other two depict the larger structure of the compound, showing barracks farther in from the street and the home of a long-term Edo-based retainer.

These simply depicted living quarters are host to the retainers interaction with and within the space. Furnishings are functional and primarily unornamented, though the spaces are decorated with a degree of freedom accorded to personal taste by their inhabitants and include scrolls, calligraphy, wall paintings and flower arrangements. In this context recreational activities are in the fore, including poetry competition, tea ceremony, playing go and archery but the overall emphasis lies in the socializing of the retainers and drinking. Toda remarks, “drinking to forget, I tip my sake cup.”13 Throughout these depictions there is an established harmony with the interior space with two notable exceptions. The first is found in painting 8, where Hiraki Kensai contemplates two women in the courtyard of the neighboring structure, the family of a retainer on long-term assignment in Edo. In the context of sankin kotai and the overwhelmingly male population on daimyo estates one can presume a longing for home and family. The second example is markedly different from the twelve other paintings in its depiction of drinking along physical destruction of architectural space, including the breaking of doors and smashing of sake bottles, brought on by despair over the prolongation of duty in Edo. It is significant to correlate the defiance of bakufu authority with the destruction of space and provides a direct link between compliance with Tokugawa law and proper conduct within its imposed architectural space.

From combining the viewpoints of these two authors a threefold comparison of architectural Edo emerges, the relation between bakufu authority and its accompanying structure, the agreement between this structure and practical necessity and the harmony of those vassals under Tokugawa rule with the physical space established by that authority.

Bibliography:

Coaldrake, William H. Architecture and Authority in Japan. London: Routledge, 1996.
(1) p. 5 (2) p. 3 (5) p. 196 (6) p. 136

Coaldrake, William H. “Edo Architecture and Tokugawa Law.” Monumenta Nipponica 36.3 (1981): 235-284.
(3) p. 235 (4) p. 238 (7) p. 240 (8) p. 269 (9) p. 257 (10) p. 279 (11) p. 281

Vaporis, Constantine N. “A Tour of Duty: Kurume Hanshi Edo Kinban Nagaya Emaki.” Monumenta Nipponica 51.3 (1996): 279-307.
(12) p. 280 (13) p. 299

1.04.2000

Tokyo Final Paper (Modern Ethnography in Japan)

Functional History in Ethnographic Japan

While comparing the ethnographies of authors Robertson and Bestor it is important to note inherent conditions of each of their approaches to urban Japanese society that inform the structure of the studies and affect the final product. The first factor is the relative size of each survey; Bestor focuses his attention on a single neighborhood in Tokyo proper while Robertson views a small city not far away in the Tokyo metropolitan prefecture. The origins of each also differ in that neighborhood Miyamoto-cho was once an agricultural hamlet engulfed by post-1923 urban expansion while the rural Ogawa-mura wasn’t consolidated with other villages and expanded into the suburban bedroom community of Kodaira until the post-war period. These aspects factor heavily into the Tokyo government’s administration of these two units as well as their demographic composition. That being said Bestor and Robertson use entirely different methodologies in their approach to, and their characterization of, ethnographic Japan.

Robertson likens her own approach to ethnography to a sculptor, conceivably an accurate metaphor for her attempt to discern and identify the dominant discourses of furusato (old village) Japan. She situates this concept as the ubiquitous buzzword of a government attempting to facilitate “cultural administration” of a society whose basic needs have been met and also as a lens, in furusato-zukuri (old village-making), for viewing the creation of the future by way of the past and the past by way of the present, essentially the commodification of history as is deemed useful. Furusato is positioned as an inherently Japanese concept that has come into widespread usage in the context of Japan attempting to assert its cultural autonomy in the face of a world rapidly becoming internationalized. More specifically she analyses the interactions of the central government and city of Kodaira in an attempt to expose administrative rhetorical strategies and the possibly misguided reshaping of popular memory to conform to a furusato ideal, even while a rift fixes between natives and newcomers. One example of this is the contrasting use of naru (to become) and tsukuru (to create) in designations of negative and positive change, respectively, in official literature. Things that have ‘become worse’ are ‘made to be better,’ eschewing accountability for motivational rhetoric. (29) While her exploration of the furusato concept is highly elaborated, it seems likely her focus on the principal actualizations of a dominant trope is limited in scope for that reason. Meanwhile, Bestor works to debunk dominant perspectives of Tokyo’s old middle class and the misrepresentation of their cultural and historical identity. He posits the notion of the isolation of urban communities as based on the false assumption that strong social ties require closed social worlds and traces “traditionalism,” in terms of manipulation of cultural patterns and symbols, as an index of interaction with rather than a departure from the larger society. (44) (262) Vying of the neighborhood and ward government for autonomy and greater control of the district displays the chokai (neighborhood association) as one of the main components of neighborhood social character as well as its official vehicle for the foray into public politics. (121)
Robertson uses a style abound in factual detail and includes many primary source documents from contemporary and historical Kodaira to communicate public interpretation of social currents. However, in their plenitude she is forced to negotiate sometimes uninformative and cumbersome studies and statistics produced by the metropolitan government, such as equating healthy neighborhood community with tsukiai, in this context the regular greeting of neighbors and watching their homes while they vacation. While her research skills as an ethnographer are immediately apparent, the lack of a strong narrative imbues an academic tone and her first-person accounts mainly provide context for additional facts, figures and clarifications. Bestor’s “thick” ethnography is rich in physical detail and often adds a human element in narrative form to his discussions of community life and social structure. The prevalence of personal testimonies, which act as private interpretations of public events, speaks to the interpersonal skills of the ethnographer and his active participation in neighborhood life.

Robertson depicts a functional history, a nonspecific but universal history that can be expropriated, modified and commodified, that is contradictory in its uses by different factions each can use to promote and substantiate their own philosophy. An anonymous historicity is mobilized in support of furusato-zukuri, in turn a reaction to the perceived cultural fatigue associated with urbanization. This “cultural administration,” the application of furusato-zukuri, appeals to nostalgia for one’s ancestral home, or even a postmodern nostalgia, for the experience of nostalgia itself, experienced by urbanites. (16) Not solely an urban phenomenon, however, furusato is also practiced by rural villages facing depopulation in order to attract “honorary villagers,” who are essentially long-term tourists. This includes the invention or retrieval of traditional village activities that ply a real or imagined nostalgia perhaps at the expense of objective authenticity but retained by real villagers. (31) In some cases historical accuracy is displaced by contemporary ramifications of new “old village-making”, as in the example of the geographic history of Kodaira as postulated in the citizen’s charter. Although inhabited for thousands of years prior, the land reclamation project that yielded Ogawa-mura and eventually Kodaira marks the beginning of this landscape’s nominal history. (74) However, while formulated to rectify the presumed culture-disintegrating effects of urban living, furusato is also an agent of antinomy; competing appropriations divide natives and newcomers in Kodaira. In reaction to increasing suburbanization and diminished demographic presence, Kodaira natives, descendants of early 18th century inhabitants, have reconstructed their identity as an exclusive institution under the banner of furusato. From self-mythologizing to maintaining exclusive parish membership rights to preserving local political power they have successfully engendered the stratification of native and newcomer. Finding themselves compelled by necessity to assimilate to newcomer’s professional way of life, successful stratification reversed the model insomuch that newcomers were expected to appropriate the “traditional” conduct embodied by the native population in order to assimilate. (189) The constitution of the citizen’s festival is another representation of the incongruity of ideas about furusato. Alternately consisting of an adult palanquin shrine not sanctified by local Shinto priest which precludes religious legitimization, a child’s palanquin symbolizing the Kodairakko, or newcomers perpetually denied status, women folk dancers acting as mediators in relegated gender roles, and a large non-civilian component that attempts to marry these disparate elements as furusato Kodaira, the festival serves as a community event while at the same time exaggerating cultural discord.

On the other hand Bestor treats functional history as an ahistorical but contemporarily authentic use of traditionalism that is used to swathe modern convention in “venerable antiquity.” However he also argues that this referencing of traditional symbols and ideals does not from any historical continuity carried over from feudal times but was precipitated in the 1920s by apprehension regarding widespread urbanization and the first emergent chokai. (69) This traditionalism is reproduced in the modern context of the old middle class responding to the stratification of status and effectively demonstrating their visibility and influence on the local community scale. This drama plays out in the chokai of urban neighborhoods that, for one, resist amalgamation by the administration as a, “means of preserving the distinct traditions” of the neighborhood and maintaining autonomy from the ward branch office. (119) The chokai also represent the structural basis of local social hierarchies, removed from the world of white-collar predominance by way of their own vertical integration and the literal absence of sarariiman in urban neighborhoods during the workday. Participation in local events also behooves those with a vested interest in neighborhood affairs and none more so than the annual matsuri (festival). The matsuri encapsulates the community’s manifest priorities in a brilliant, if discrete display. The festival is carefully organized weeks ahead of time by the festival committee, appointments to which reinforce the community’s social stratification yet are outshined by a spirit of egalitarianism and group harmony. (235) Similar to the citizen’s festival in Kodaira, the main occasion of the matsuri is the procession of the tutelary deity carried in a palanquin through the neighborhood, symbolically directed along the neighborhood’s borders as an assertion of local cohesion and autonomy. (241) These traditional ideals of community life are reified by the festival and other community events in that their continued practice garners the authenticity of tradition as well as prestige for the whole community.

Robertson’s methodically detailed portrait of furusato as both a catalyst and a hindrance to social betterment suggests that after over a decade of implementation and virtual omnipresence in mass media, “cultural administration,” at least at the time of publication, is still in a prototypical phase that lacks real transformative power. This is reinforced by the trope’s virtual absence in Bestor’s ethnography, citing the concepts komyunitei and machi-zukuri as misconceived urban community models that presume the infeasibility of cohesive urbanization independent of government community-building policies. Bestor asserts the positive influence of chokai and informal institutions in sustaining community life as well as the constancy of neighborhood partisans.

Bibliography:

Bestor, Theodore C. Neighborhood Tokyo. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989.

Robertson, Jennifer. Native and Newcomer: Making and Remaking a Japanese City. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

1.03.2000

Korean War Seminar Midterm Paper (Origins of the Korean War)

Origins of the Korean War

As the onset of the Cold War struck the Western world into two divided factions, the Far East, Korea in particular, became the first major arena for international contention and geopolitical jockeying of the two post-war superpowers. However, this international history was at the same time laid over a preexistent regional strife and, following the defeat of the Empire of Japan, an uncertain future for the Korean people. It was this uncertainty that was enhanced, complicated, and eventually warred over by the United States and Soviet bloc.

Some may contend that the Korean War’s origins are entirely civil or international in origin. Focusing on the disagreement between the United States’ actions on the international scale and the mishandling of the American military government and Rhee’s regime in South Korea, I argue that the volatility of international politics at that time made it impossible for outside forces to successfully stabilize the precarious situation in Korea and regulate the formation of a united, independent nation. However, it was the irreconcilability of all parties’ interests, including the Soviet Union, the United States, the UN, leaders on both sides of the 38th parallel, and the Korean people themselves, that doomed South Korea to years of instability and an inevitable armed conflict. The political stalemate that eventuated from the international down to the community level in South Korea should come as no surprise, and indeed the harbinger of the Korean War.

In this survey I will first address the pursuit of self-serving policies and subsequent frustrations of international players in Korea, which is principally highlighted by the dealings between the United States and Soviet Union. These negotiations took on the character of Cold War strategies while failing to realistically address the circumstances of a newly liberated, yet divided Korea. Secondly I will examine the United States presence in Korea, from the first missteps of the military government to dealing with an intractable South Korean administration, as well as Syngman Rhee’s role in aggravating the hostilities within his own regime.

Perhaps the initial act paving the way towards the Korean War was the establishment of the 38th parallel as the demarcation line between politically oppositional American and Soviet occupation forces. Locked in an international confrontation, to these superpowers Korea represented less a struggle to unify a country than the opening of a new front on which to contend, and possibly humiliate or best the other. Consequently the Soviets backed Kim Il Sung, a Communist who purportedly fought with the Russians in the Second World War, and the United States supported Syngman Rhee, a long-time exile whose vehemently anti-Communist stance won him favor with the Americans but whose ambition would soon eclipse anything but supreme leader of Korea. The implication here is that with the inception of two inherently antagonistic factions in the North and South, both marked by fervent nationalism and political single-mindedness, the prospect of a timely or peaceful unification had already been closed.

With this in mind, in late 1945 the Americans and Soviets agreed to a four-power trusteeship of Korea and the formation of a U.S.—Soviet Joint Commission to reconcile their administrations toward an interim government. In the absence of prospective unification, trusteeship was an acceptable alternative from an international perspective; but vastly overlooked was the point that a new foreign-delegated administration was anathema to Koreans who had spent their last 35 years under Japanese colonization. (Allan 75) The forcible acceptance of trusteeship on the part of a Communists directive lent popular support and solidarity to the rightists in South Korea, but the Soviets also meant to give themselves political leverage: In further meetings of the Joint Commission they obstinately stipulated that all Koreans who opposed the Moscow agreement should be excluded from consultations pertaining to the formation of a provisional government i.e. everyone except for their North Korean adherents. (Allan 80) This among other issues plagued the Joint Commission, and as the negotiations finally ground to a halt in 1947 the United States turned to the newly formed United Nations for support in supervising national elections and advising the establishment of a unified, independent Korea. However, the presence of the UN guaranteed neither immediate independence nor unification for Koreans, as the position of the UN was generally in accord with United States foreign policy and the Soviets made their noncooperation clear. Barring the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea entry into the North while at the same time advancing their own Soviet-inspired regime, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the UN could only monitor and verify elections in the South, and when the UN formally recognized the Republic of Korea in 1948 it was wittingly ambiguous as to whether the ROK represented South Korea or Korea as a whole, though the ROK goes on to claim this prerogative in its constitution. (Lowe 48)

For many Koreans, and indeed members of the UN superintending body, the idea of separate elections was a contentious issue, representing the official disunion of the peninsula, even though the formalization of two discrete states had been ideologically preordained by a joint U.S.-Soviet occupation. After determining the governing capacity of the ROK the UN commission advocated the prompt withdrawal of American and Soviet occupying troops and the restructuring of the commission itself as a permanent body. However, their qualification of military extraction was the opening of negotiations between North Korea and the nascent ROK prior to withdrawal; the UN’s disregard for this prerequisite was likely the enabler of further deterioration of relations between the divided Koreas. (Lowe 49) While the transfer of management to UN control also aided United States plans for expedient withdrawal from South Korea, the actual timeliness of a U.S. withdrawal of troops was hampered by the relative unreadiness of South Korea’s forces compared to the North’s, and Soviet geopolitical advantage with regards to their subordinate administration in North Korea—in other words continual fears of a Communist sweep of the peninsula.

It is this dilemma, the dissonance between the diminishing viability of continued economic and military support of South Korea and the unacceptability of Communist ascendancy on the Korean peninsula, which characterizes America’s equivocal policies in Korea before June 1950. As head of the Western bloc, by the mid-40s the United States had major economic and military commitments all over the world; the designation of Korea as not a vital strategic asset coupled with Kennan’s then-prevailing policy of asymmetrical response made the American divisions stationed in Korea and the vast sums aid seem likely to have better uses elsewhere. It wasn’t all just a matter of foreign policy, though, as Congress would not always approve the large expenditures the administration requested. (Lowe 59) The United States’ seemingly noncommittal intentions influenced many a defeatist attitude of inevitable Soviet conquest on the peninsula, both at home and abroad. Nevertheless, while it may have been strategically expendable, a Communist-controlled Korea would threaten the security of the entire Far East, especially if the Soviet Union considered Korea as a jumping-off point, a region where the United States clearly did have an essential interest in Japan. Abandoning Korea would disconcert America’s allies in the region and any other nonessential but U.S.-friendly areas, as well as significantly damage the prestige of the United States and the authority of the UN once they became involved. Losing Korea was still a worst-case scenario even after the American’s withdrawal, as evidenced by the approval of Economic Cooperation Administration aid to Korea and the sustained presence of the Korean Military Advisory Group, both after the official end of the occupation. Perhaps the greatest foreign policy blunder of the administration was its lack of clarity in expressing a realistic position on the Korean situation. While it is obvious now that the United States would go to war to protect its interests there, Korea was frequently left out of the Asiatic defensive perimeter, most famously by Acheson in early 1950. (Lowe 63) Willing to go to great lengths to avoid an overt war with the United States, without this unintentional encouragement from the U.S. the Soviet Union was far less likely to have authorized North Korea’s invasion plans and it is likely that international conflict could have been averted—I argue that international conflict was preventable and not civil conflict because the events leading up to the creation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north and the Republic of Korea in the south irrevocably precipitated an armed struggle between the emergent states as a desperate means of unification, which the international community had failed to achieve through diplomatic means. In addition, while the onset of the Korean War is often attributed to the date of the North’s invasion on June 25 of 1950, North and South Korea had been in a de facto state of civil war since the early joint occupation in 1945, with the 38th parallel the primary setting for intermittent clashes between their forces.

By examining the relationship of the United States with Korea not in the respect of directly causing the Korean conflict but as a destabilizing influence on South Korea, we find that the military government had an unintentional hand in shaping how and when the war erupted. As enumerated above, the ambivalence of American foreign policy was a major originating factor in the outbreak of the Korean War, but here I would like to review the role the United States played within South Korea, both in the maladroit governance in the early stages of the occupation and the consequent ascendancy of the loose cannon that was Syngman Rhee. Perhaps the most central individual to the preliminary shaping of South Korea was General John Reed Hodge, head of the military government for the first three turbulent years. Upon Hodge’s arrival, politicos in South Korea had already begun to factionalize and vie for legitimacy. His qualifications and preparedness aside, in the rapid pursuit of stability and a control framework, Hodge’s vigorous and hardline anti-Communism approach led him to govern without first considering the full extent of Korean circumstances.

After liberation from Japanese rule, Koreans were ready for radical reforms in the causes of democracy, expeditious independence, and unification. A glimpse of this revolutionary spirit was found in Lyuh Wun-hyung and the People’s Republic of Korea, the interim government active between Japanese surrender and the arrival of the occupational forces, who were successful in maintaining order and found popular support through the inception of People’s Committees in local communities. (Allan 74) However, the moderate liberal socialism of the PRK was fundamentally tinged with Communism in Hodge’s eyes, as all leftist organizations were, and therefore it was rebuffed without hesitation. (Allan 75) The rightists on the other hand, still forming coalitions and preliminary committees, were seen as the most likely advocates of the occupation. The main appeal of ultranationalist Syngman Rhee was that he was firstly a staunch rightist, but whose recent homecoming after decades of a political career in exile signified a lack of any pro-Japanese blemish and also sizeable political capital and public appeal. However, it wouldn’t take long for Rhee’s considerable ambitions to make the military government lament their choice of advocate. Perhaps due to his Illinois-farm boy naiveté or possibly a latent prejudice towards Asian peoples, Hodge detected nothing of Rhee’s treacherous aspirations until it was far too late to change course. (Lowe 27) Known to be at once hypocritical and obstinate, irrational and demanding, emotional and calculating, all of Rhee’s strategies were similarly geared toward the concentration of his own power, in his mind for the good of Korea but more likely the self-delusion of a megalomaniac. (Allan 105) The allies Rhee made during his extensive period abroad would allow him to undercut the occupation’s jurisdiction, and his bevy of aggressive political tactics combined with his seemingly unassailable public support loosed Rhee from American diplomatic controls. Even so, for lack of a replacement nearly half as popular, Hodge and his advisors were committed their support of Rhee and his coalitions even while he railed against the military government and called for immediate independence without trusteeship, and even campaigned for separate elections in the South before the formal division of Korea. The strength of the M.G.’s commitment is most evident in the breakdown of negotiations of the Joint Commission in 1947 due to the rightist camp’s opposition to trusteeship and the American delegation’s obligation to concur. Political unrest heightens all over Korea as Rhee broadens his crusade against trusteeship to encompass the Joint Commission and both the American and Soviet occupations, forcing the United States, attacked by both left and right, to begin considering withdrawal from Korea and the transfer of advisement to the United Nations. (Lowe 34-5)

But why would the American administration tether itself to the nearly autonomous and unpredictable Rhee? The repudiation of moderate leftism and the military government’s conservatism in a time when comprehensive reforms were feverishly anticipated had catalyzed the radicalization of politics in South Korea. Hodge’s attempt at reconciliation by establishing the Left-Right Coalition Committee would ultimately prove ineffective, and the tenacious People’s Committees left over from the interim People’s Republic became bastions of the radical (and not so radical) leftism that would blight the country’s stability for years. Indeed British consul-general D. W. Kermode attributed the final impasse of Korea to Hodge’s extension of antagonism to the moderate left in the early occupational period. (Lowe 30) The answer also stems from one of the more glaring missteps of the military government in Korea—while it was not uncanny that the United States retained some of the Japanese officials in the bureaucracy, the lack of initiative in transitioning to suitable replacements in due course constituted a major oversight and an affront to recently liberated Koreans. (Lowe 21) The administration’s concurrent support of organizations with notorious Japanese-collaboration backgrounds cost them dearly in reputation and the widespread support of moderates and leftists. This left the right, the camp most associated with pro-Japanese inclinations, as the most viable option through which to effect their authority, and Rhee a populist vehicle with which to rehabilitate their public position. That is not to say Rhee’s regime was without the taint of pro-Japanese collaborators, which it undoubtedly was. Rhee’s constituency was made up significantly by the landowning elite left over from Japanese rule, who supported Rhee in return for the preservation of their power, which effectively disenfranchised the provincial poor. (Allan 105) Also, the main action arm of Rhee’s regime was the Korean National Police, approximately 80 percent of which were former Japanese police employees. (Tucker 797) The legacy of cruelty from the years of Japanese colonization left the police vulnerable to public wrath, and continued to be “ruthlessly brutal in suppressing disorder.” (Cumings 186, Allan 84) While for the most part autonomous from the military government, Rhee’s police state was much preferred to a revolutionary regime and in that way tacitly commissioned by the occupation. (Cumings 188-9) In effect Rhee’s KNP, together with rightist paramilitary youth groups, mainly formed after the savage uprisings in autumn 1946, and the Student National Defense Corps that extended government control to all student organizations, maintained a brutal and terroristic stranglehold on the peninsula that was both the originator and best method of stamping out disorder and resistance from radical elements. (Cumings 201) However, the high levels of class struggle still present in Korea and low levels of organized revolt suggest a continual peasant war against an oppressive system and not a coordinated guerrilla campaign, at least not till after the extremely bloody Cheju-do and subsequent Yosu-Sunch’on Rebellions. (Cumings 269, 282)

These two 1948 insurgencies, while eventually put down with unyielding force, attest to the perpetual cycle of violence and discord in pre-war South Korea, if not continuing into the post-war. On the largely ignored island of Cheju-do they harbored sentiments of separatism from the mainland as well as the continued presence of People’s Committees. (Cumings 252) Over the course of a few weeks protests against separate elections in South Korea escalated to island-wide riots and then into a full-scale guerrilla action that took over a year to fully eradicate, by the end of which time one in five islanders had been killed and over half the villages destroyed. (Cumings 253, 258) In the midst of the Cheju-do uprising, elements in the Republic of Korea’s Army stationed in Yosu rejected their imminent counterinsurgency mission on Cheju-do and rebelled against their regiment. (Cumings 260) Capturing the city of Yosu they gained momentum and spread westward into the city of Sunch’on as more people joined the apparently spontaneous mutiny. While the rebellion was crushed in about ten days, the order they imposed on captured territory during that time curiously resembled Lyuh Wun-hyung’s interim government that predated the Republic of Korea. (Cumings 262) Following these incidents, and in response to continued guerrilla activity, major terror campaigns were enacted and civil liberties suppressed. (Cumings 267) While Bruce Cumings calls Rhee’s one unqualified success the apparent defeat of Southern partisanship by the spring of 1950, the doggedness of the peasants and the guerrillas in their protracted efforts, as well as the barbaric extent of the maneuvers required to contain those efforts speaks volumes about the tension and instability within and outside of South Korea. (Cumings 285) It is also important to note that although the militant aspect of the rebellions was invariably put down, that does not as a consequence strike the contention from the mind of the people. The ultimate defeat of struggling partisans in the South also dashes North Korea’s hopes for unification by revolution, further cementing their invasion plans.

Considering the aforementioned patterns and examples I am hard-pressed to find a truly causal relationship between the actions of any one player resulting in the outbreak of the Korean War, with two exceptions. The first was the politically unavoidable yet completely ill-founded and supposedly arbitrary decision to divide Korea along the 38th parallel, and the inevitable failure to abate or contain the ensuing conflict. Due to South Korea’s chronic instability in the five-year span preceding the Korean War, the questions I am left with echo the concern of American intelligence agencies at the time: North Korea’s gross underestimate of the significance of partisan support in the unification with the South, the abandonment of the idea of unification by revolution in South Korea, and their provision to the southern partisans of little more than their blessing. (Cumings 283)

Bibliography:

Allen, Richard C. Korea’s Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait. Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1960.

Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

Lowe, Peter. The Origins of the Korean War. New York: Longman, 1986.

Rhee, Syngman. The Spirit of Independence. Trans. Kim Han-kyo. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001.

Encyclopedia of the Korean War: a political, social, and military history. Ed. Spencer C. Tucker. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, c2000.

1.02.2000

Korean War Seminar Final Paper (Foreign Policy in North Korea)

INROADS:
Transforming North Korea from the Inside Out

Argument

Assuming that America’s ultimate diplomatic goal in Northeast Asia is the normalization of relations between the United States and North Korea, as well as the stability and prosperity the entire region, our highest priority must be to revamp the dilapidated status of our continued dialogue with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We must move away from a discourse that, between spells of neglect and provocation, principally bargains the economic aid and diplomatic conditions of the United States for military concessions from North Korea, both in broad terms and in more acute circumstances, to a position that encompasses tolerance within reason and reduction of U.S. forces, setting up a framework that allows for the independent demilitarization of the Korean peninsula as well as fostering economic rehabilitation and progress in North Korea. There is a plethora of justifications for this shift, proven time and time again by frequently stalemated negotiations between the United States government and its regional allies and the People’s Republic in addition to the latter’s regular pattern of compliance followed by a sharp return to hermetic brinksmanship.

It is also my assumption that the desired outcome of the reconciliation of U.S.-D.P.R.K. diplomatic relations being pursued is not merely a vehicle for sustaining negotiations of disarmament but the realized prerequisite for normalized economic and trade relations and, ultimately, progressive change within the People’s Republic. Thinking in this mode, one can imagine the potential future of Korea like a column of dominoes ready to tumble: Once the United States lifts the immobilizing threat of its own offensive capabilities, the first domino, North Korea’s “permanent siege mentality,” will fall, taking with it the excuse for maintaining dangerous weapons programs as well as a bloated military-industrial complex. When the inherent danger of that complex, which is also the heaviest burden on North Korea’s ailing economy, is dispelled so too will be the reservations of potential outside investors. The domino of economic reform will already be pitching forward from the pressure of reformers, empowered by constructive relations with the West, by the time the benefits of foreign capital become overwhelming. Investment begets recovery, if not prosperity, and the D.P.R.K. finds itself with greater credibility and legitimacy than perhaps ever before in its history, from which point political reform, social liberalization, and even expedient reunification would be realistically within reach. By remodeling our regional presence as one addressing economic concerns while downplaying the need for deterrence by removing outside pressure the United States and its allies can slowly make inroads into the North Korean government and by legitimating those who support liberalization, and slowly transform the country from the inside out. However, the first domino has yet to fall, as the United States still hasn’t been able to release its nonproliferation-centered position. This study provides first a recapitulation of the U.S.-D.P.R.K. dialogues in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century as well as elaborates the hows and whys of shifting away from tense and often dire security-based deliberations to a more transparent relationship with a focus on improving economic ties.

U.S.-D.P.R.K. Security-based Relations

Beginning in 1958 the United States strategically deployed and positioned nuclear weapons in Korea in addition to their established ground forces. It was not until 1991 that a presidential initiative, in response to the end of the Cold War, withdrew or destroyed all remaining nuclear weapons on the peninsula. Significantly, however, South Korea still remained firmly under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella.” Having grudgingly joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, Pyongyang decided to withdraw from the N.P.T. when International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors demanded greater access to their nuclear facilities, sparking off what would become the most acute nuclear crisis of the 1990s. While their withdrawal was eventually suspended, the failure of verifiable inspections sent the Clinton administration and United Nations towards sanctions and wartime planning. If not for former President Carter’s intervention, preemptive strikes and another war in Korea may have been unavoidable. However, the result was successful negotiations that led to the Agreed Framework, essentially freezing North Korean nuclear and missile programs for the rest of the decade. The concessions given by the D.P.R.K. in 1994 betray the true value they place on economic, diplomatic, and security benefits from the United States rather than weapon development and sale, as well as highlight the viability of a progressive economy-based approach. (O’Hanlon 96) The alleviation of security tensions led to the easing of our nearly fifty-year old trade embargo and an upswing in North Korea’s economic and diplomatic prospects, though this would not last more than a few years. The dilatory pace of Washington in improving economic and diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and roadblocks in negotiations surrounding the construction of new, less weaponization-prone reactors led to the North Korea’s dissatisfaction with the agreement and possibly the quiet resumption of uranium enrichment. The Bush administration’s confrontation of the D.P.R.K. over an alleged secretly renewed nuclear program led to the final disintegration of the Agreed Framework and landed North Korea in President Bush’s “axis of evil.” This rhetorical status combined with the concurrent preemptive policy of first use of nuclear weapons of the United States greatly inflamed the tensions between the two countries. In 2003 the D.P.R.K. responded by once again announcing their withdrawal from the N.P.T., which this time was followed through on, and the official resumption of their nuclear program. This year was also marked by the inception of the Six Party Talks, a multilateral forum for deliberations with members from the United States, both Korean governments, Japan, China, and Russia. However, the talks’ inability to reconcile conflicting interests of the six parties meant the repeated breakdown of the talks over the course of the next four years. 2006 saw the polar reversal of U.S. foreign policy after North Korea tested a nuclear device, with the sobered administration now hasty to engage in bilateral talks and to make energy and diplomatic concessions, all of which President Bush has previously spurned. Perhaps in line with this new policy the next two years saw an agreement finally reached by the Six Party Talks and the mothballing once again of North Korea’s nuclear program, and also North Korea’s removal from the United States’ list of state sponsors of terrorism, on which they had been listed since 1988. However, to date North Korea has resumed its missile tests and nuclear aspirations as well as proclaimed the end of their participation in future nuclear talks, making the failure of both coercion and myopic engagement abundantly clear and underlining the need for a real shift in the regional paradigm. (Richter)

Defense Considerations

The crucial phase of normalizing U.S.-D.P.R.K. relations while at the same time preserving regional stability hinges on the de-emphasis of current defense postures of all the most entangled parties—namely the United States and both Korean governments, whether those programs derive from deterrence measures, extortion, or otherwise. Grounds for this reasoning are abundant, the first being that our pre-emptive and offensive strategies are fundamentally unacceptable in the projected cost of the lives of servicemen and civilians, and also in terms of the magnitude of destruction that would inevitably be inflicted on both sides of the Military Demarcation Line. While pre-emptive measures against nuclear sites may seem prescriptively justified and in all probability would be surgical compared to an invasion, they would without a doubt lead directly to a renewed Korean war, which North Korea itself has articulated. Several factors reinforce the reality that a campaign on the Korean peninsula would be much more hard-won and bloody than the relative precision of the invasion of Iraq; these include the grave destructive capabilities of North Korean forces stationed in proximity to Seoul, the subterranean nature of many North Korean defensive sites and the inherent loss of the advantage of American air superiority, and the sheer size of the North Korean force, as well as their level of indoctrination. (O. 61) Barring a D.P.R.K.-initiated war or equivalent threat to international security, the option of renewing armed conflict in Korea should be tabled indefinitely. As Bruce Cumings has said, “there never was a military solution in Korea, as we should have learned in 1953, and there certainly isn’t now.”

That being said it is chances are remote that Pyongyang will ever take deliberate action meriting an armed response from the United States, the current situation in North Korea being very different from that which preceded the Korean War in 1950. Perpetual isolation from the global economy and the stagnation of their domestic financial conditions means that while North Korea maintains inordinate martial forces, it is unable to prevent the deterioration of overall military effectiveness and capacity to sustain a lengthy or far-reaching offensive. In addition, the last decades of the twentieth century saw the erosion of the Cold War paradigms that positioned Korea in the front-guard of international Communism. The ultimate collapse of the Soviet power base and the end of Maoism, together with China and Russia’s cool opposition to the North’s nuclear program, finds these former patrons no longer willing to intervene in a war that is not explicitly precipitated by the United States. Without this guarantee, which it had proceeded with in the Korean War, the D.P.R.K. has no convincing prospects of a substantial victory in a renewed Korean conflict while a U.S.-R.O.K. security treaty is in effect. (Harrison XXI) The most ambitious outcome North Korea could hope for would be the ransoming of Seoul, vastly unlikely due to the severity with which it would deepen the rift between the two countries. (O. 116) Even if there are still hostilities between the two countries, the underlying desire for eventual reunification dictates a minimum of diplomacy and the gradual, if rocky, broadening of relations.

Since military solutions to the current standoff are unrealistic on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone, the defensive posture and aggressive diplomatic stance maintained by the United States is at best a hindrance to diplomacy, at worst a destabilizing presence for the entire peninsula. First of all, the collapse scenarios envisioned by some in Washington since the mid-nineties, which unfortunately influenced the stagnation of Agreed Framework policy, have by now lost all credibility. U.S. policies of economic strangulation and regime change are unrealistic due to the centralized nature of the D.P.R.K. and the reluctance of regional powers to cooperate with such policies. The allocation of food resources is tightly controlled, and it has become clear that the leadership in Pyongyang is willing to allow their people to starve before relinquishing power; any fracturing of the regime would follow a humanitarian crisis of terrible proportions. (H. 26) This crisis would also precipitate unrest and the influx of refugees into the entire region, and thus North Korea’s neighbors, especially China, maintain a baseline of aid to prevent this eventuality. This circumstance, along with the United States’ dearth of trade with the D.P.R.K. in the first place render further economic sanctions perfunctory and ineffective in modifying North Korea’s political attitudes. (Lankov) Perhaps the most compelling example in discrediting collapse-minded relations is the fact that North Korea has faced over a decade of economic decline, including years of severe famine, and has yet to show any sign of serious internal foundering. (O. 4)

The impolitic nature of our strategic positioning may seem counterintuitive using the rationale that the U.S. military presence acts as a deterrent for North Korean aggression, but the real result is a volatile regional dynamic that in fact legitimizes and sustains the D.P.R.K.’s swollen defense programs. Developed initially as a response to U.S. deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula, the continuation of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs finds its primary motivation, as declared by the D.P.R.K. itself, in the substantial threat constituted by a nuclear first use policy retained by the U.S., the maintenance of significant conventional forces in South Korea and a generally aggressive foreign policy. (H. XXV) (KCNA) Another compelling reason for nuclear and missile development is the relatively light burden these programs put on the struggling North Korean economy when compared to the maintenance of a large conventional force. (H. XXV)

Formed in the tempestuous years preceding the Korean War, the D.P.R.K. naturally spawned a military power base that was prefigured on hostile neighbors in South Korea and the United States, and continues to be today. A “permanent siege mentality,” has been propagated since Kim Il Sung’s regime and is continued in Kim Jong Il’s “Military First” policy, a concept similar in design to his father’s juche, literally “self-reliance,” in espousing North Korea’s national struggle. These ideologies, in addition to the ubiquitous cult of personality surrounding Kim Il Sung, and to a lesser degree his son, effectively override traditional religious practices and demand social and economic participation. (O. 27) This network of nationalistic ideologies is what drives the military-industrial complex that dominates North Korean politics and economics, as well as substantiates the development of nuclear, missile and satellite programs. In fact, Kim Jong Il has gone as far as to say that sustaining these programs is “unavoidable, for the sake of defending our honor and sovereignty.” (H. 19) None of the ways in which the United States has conducted its relations with the D.P.R.K. have sought to diminish these powerful ideological forces in a meaningful way, and instead have mostly acted in line with or possibly even exacerbated them by following a primarily tactical, crisis-driven approach. (O. 44)

While it is both futile and hypocritical for Washington to demand disarmament while maintaining an aggressive stance towards North Korea, the hard-line negotiating tactics practiced for most of the Bush years operated almost exclusively on this notion, providing the D.P.R.K. little to no realistic incentives for demilitarization. (O. 17) We have also seen, however, the failure of concessionary deliberations under both Clinton and Bush administrations, as they increase the appeal of “extortionomics” practiced by North Korea and inadequately address the broader security schemes of Northeast Asia. (O. 13) In fact, the entire format of security-first negotiations that lack a strong economic complement has proved myopic and unsuccessful, as we find no significant qualitative difference between the current regime’s position and that of the era prior to the Agreed Framework. The crux of the arguments presented here is the fact that some North Koreans, including Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, have accepted the need for demilitarization as a prerequisite to economic recovery and progress and have actively pursued it, but that the overwhelming threat of U.S. strategic forces has countermanded this initiative in Korean politics since the end of the Korean War. (H. 139) This is well evidenced by willingness of North Korea to shut down its nuclear program in return for assurances of its security, which it has done multiple times, regardless of the eventual outcome of many deliberations. The implicit threat of the American military presence and nuclear umbrella empowers military hawks of the Old Guard in the politburo as well as furthers North Korea’s desperate isolation, indeed it is the most conspicuous obstruction to successful U.S.-D.P.R.K. relations.

Defense Considerations in Practice

The first step towards relieving U.S.-D.P.R.K. tensions, and thus the security deadlock in Korea, is putting an official end to the Korean War and replacing the broken down armistice apparatus with a regional security agreement. Selig S. Harrison outlines a succinct number of steps for achieving this long delayed reconciliation while maintaining regional relationships, which finds its shape in the North Korean concept of a trilateral mutual security commission with the United States and South Korea:

Establishment of the new trilateral body could be conditioned on the simultaneous activation of the North-South Joint Military Commission agreed upon in 1991 but never put into operation. After these two interlinked steps are completed, the United States could then conclude peace treaties with North Korea and China, replacing the armistice, promote a separate North-South peace agreement upgrading the 1991 Basic Agreement, and terminate the U.N. Command. The three peace accords could then be submitted by the governments concerned to the U.N. Security Council, which would endorse them collectively as constituting the definitive end of the Korean War. (H. 190)

Some of these measures are contentious and complex in regards to the U.S. relationship with South Korea, especially the termination of U.N. command of Allied forces in Korea, however, if the process outlined by Harrison is completed as a comprehensive package then the tensions and fears besetting regional security can be resolved simultaneously. Once the Korean War has formally ended, the stage will be set for the trilateral demilitarization of Korea, which would substantiate any security pact as well as being a universally accepted necessity for the North’s economic recuperation. Authors O’Hanlon and Mochizuki have proposed a “Conventional Forces in Korea” accord modeled after the NATO-Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, stressing parity in force reductions considering the superior numbers of Northern forces and superior quality technology and readiness of the South. (O. 6) They make a convincing argument for the benefits of large reductions and allied retainment of strategic advantage, and yet do not even address the option of U.S. force disengagement, instead counting U.S. forces against South Korean numbers in a solely Korean disarmament scheme that would surely not appeal to the North Korean military intellect. Concurrent with Korean force reductions, the U.S. must be prepared to redeploy or reduce its forces asymmetrically favoring the North and not rule out the eventual and complete disengagement of its presence in Korea, the true specter to diplomacy. While this might seem outlandish to those who favor coercion or other overbearing tactics, what must be acknowledged is the relative harmlessness of the D.P.R.K. when compared to the great threat to its existence that U.S. military presence represents and the diminutive sovereignty retained by North Korea in light of strangling economic barriers.

With that in mind, as well as the unlikelihood of either party instigating a renewed conflict, I would propose the abandonment, at least for the near future, of nuclear disarmament considerations before the normalization of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the D.P.R.K. instead of the opposite, which is currently an insurmountable hurdle for North Korean economic reform. There are many mediating factors when considering living with a nuclear North Korea, the first being the relatively modest proportions of the North Korean nuclear arsenal, thanks in part to the official dormancy of these programs between 1994 and 2003. Also it would be foolish to think that the region is at the nuclear whim of the D.P.R.K. if the U.S. does not deploy nuclear arms in Korea. Harrison asserts that a nuclear North Korea is acceptable for the present given our retaliatory capabilities, as indeed we live with China and Russia as well as a host of other nuclear powers in various shades of contention. (H. XXVII) On the other hand the Korean Central News Agency, one of the main policy and propaganda conduits in North Korea, has declared that “the DPRK will never use nuclear weapons first,” and that their “nuclear weapons will serve as reliable war deterrent.” (KCNA) Both Washington and Pyongyang citing deterrence as incentive reveals a hollow standoff with neither side losing or gaining ground but merely serving to further entrench the other in their position. The real danger of the situation is the motivation for the nuclearization of South Korea and Japan, though this is but another reason to put a timely end to the U.S.-D.P.R.K. nuclear standoff. Harrison notes that while the current strategic positions are held the balance of forces in Pyongyang “is shifting with each passing year in favor of the pro-nuclear lobby,” and that a renewed opportunity for denuclearization talks hinges largely on U.S. willingness to both disengage its conventional forces as well as retract its nuclear umbrella from the peninsula; however if D.P.R.K.’s security concerns are adequately addressed, its nuclear programs would lose their sanctity within North Korean politics and in a resulting period of burgeoning economic progress come to represent a political liability more than a military deterrent. (H XXV)

Economic Engagement

After the normalization of relations between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has commenced on the security front, the most important step in order to prevent a relapse into hostilities is to address the recovery and liberalization of North Korea’s economy. The heaviest financial burden on the North Korean economy is its inequitable defense budget, which strained North Korea’s economy even before its economic difficulties following the end of the Cold War, and rollbacks in that area precipitated by demilitarization would greatly improve their prospects for recovery. (H. 139) It was estimated in 2002 that defense spending as percentage of gross domestic product reached twenty-five percent, higher than any other country in the world. This is due undoubtedly to their military-industrial complex, but when compared to South Korea the North’s defense expenditures make up less than a third of the formers’ and their GDP totals less than two percent of that of the South, revealing the true disadvantage at which the North finds itself. (O. 64) Another major problem of defense is the sapping of domestic resources, especially industrial facilities and manpower. While heavy industry devotes much of its output to the armed forces, many factories lay dormant and abundant resources such as gold, anthracite, and possibly even petroleum go untapped owing to a lack of energy and transportation infrastructure and fuel. (H. 48) North Korea also maintains a humongous conventional force of over a million active-duty troops, earning another world record with approximately one in every twenty-two North Koreans enlisted, at the same time sequestering a major portion of its able workforce in an idle military. (O. 26) If the infrastructure of the country ran at full capacity North Korea would still be at an economic disadvantage due to its isolation from global markets and lack of outside investors. One reason for this is that North Korea has been served poorly by juche, the rallying cry of the beloved Kim Il Sung. Conceived in 1955, this ideal of self-reliance and national struggle meant that by the 1970s the isolationist D.P.R.K. had yet to merit significant international trade relations, in an ironic turn becoming heavily dependent on its communist forebears for economic exchange, as well as food and fuel subsidies. (H. 15) Another effect of this isolation was that while an industrial blitz mechanized cooperative labor and built an impressive industrial infrastructure further development was stunted by the lack of advanced technologies available only from abroad, resulting in increasingly obsolescent production sectors. (H. 28) As the Cold War ended the subsidies from China and the Soviet Union dried up, sending North Korea into a period of rapid economic decline, which was compounded by environmental disaster in the mid-1990s. It has yet to recover from this downturn, still plagued by inoperative assets, limited foreign investment, and a large foreign debt.

There is no instant remedy for an economic situation as shaky as North Korea’s, but there are precedents for the kind of transformation the North Korean economy needs to go through in order to achieve recovery and ultimately true self-reliance. However, the success stories of China and Vietnam show that reforms and entrepreneurial activity are viable even while maintaining a communist government. (O. 129) These examples are particularly salient due to the reluctance of many D.P.R.K. official to activate economic reforms for fear of inadvertently eroding the Party’s legitimacy by deviating from the stark socialist path of the previous sixty years. However, the tribulations of the past two decades surely must have deteriorated that legitimacy in the minds of North Koreans as much as any failed economic reforms possibly could have. In fact, the D.P.R.K. has implemented reforms in the past, if halfheartedly, with moderate levels of success.

By the late seventies, cognizant of the discrepancies beginning to form between the economies of North and South Korea, pragmatic bureaucrats and Worker’s Party members, as well as North Koreans who had spent time abroad, began to exert pressure for partial liberalization from within the D.P.R.K. political arena. This culminated in the invitation of the United Nations Development Program to open a Pyongyang office in 1979. (H. 28) Although this nascent movement was curtailed by fears of a snowballing liberal trend, the idea of reform-minded overtures would not be entirely forgotten. Both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il would visit China in the early eighties, followed by the signing of a new joint venture law that sought increased foreign investment. 1991 saw the opening of the first Special Economic Zone in the Rajin-Songbong area, of which there are now numerous examples, complete with their own regulations designed to authorize free trade and entice joint ventures, especially from the South. Investment in these new zones has been lukewarm and growth slow, due in part to sanctions barring the export of manufactured goods to the U.S. as well as investment from American firms. (H. 33) The United States has also blocked North Korea from joining international financial institutions, such as the Asian Development Bank, in line with a policy of economic strangulation. (H. 35) While these obstacles to international investment are still in place, the last decade has seen the explosion of small, quasi-legal private markets, embarked on by farmers during the food crisis of the mid-nineties. By choosing to look the other way, Kim Jong Il aligned himself with North Korean reformers and perhaps inadvertently spearheaded a grassroots movement towards economic liberalization. (H. 25) While bolstering military authority and reinforcing the role of the state in the economy, Kim Jong Il’s 1998 revamped constitution omitted mention of “independent development,” authorized private farmer’s markets, and left room for further economic reforms, both domestic and relating to foreign policy. (H. 37) Though an unofficial market economy continues to expand gradually the deterioration of relations between the D.P.R.K. and the U.S. in the early 2000s saw the reversal of many of the fruits of formal economic progress and as of 2008 a central, strictly controlled command economy is back in place. (Petrov)

However, an important avenue of change is still open to Western influence. Since the early nineties there has been a steadily growing contingent of reformers inside the D.P.R.K. and a resultant clash between those reformers and members of the Old Guard, one that will ultimately decide the direction of the country. (H. 25) The former, comprised primarily of technocrats and pragmatic economic advisors and officials, have had some major victories (and losses) in the creation of Special Economic Zones, admittance of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, and sporadic reforms and diplomatic concessions contributing to a gradual influx of foreign investment. They have also been the primary internal proponents of denuclearization and demilitarization. However, the political power of the military elite and hawkish strategists who oppose force cuts allows them to overturn progressive policies when they have the slightest bit of political capital, which is generated frequently by the tenuous U.S.-D.P.R.K. relationship. Harrison maintains that while Pyongyang seeks improved diplomatic relations with Washington a fierce debate rages behind the scenes, “with the shifting course of the North Korean policy struggle directly attuned to the evolving U.S. posture towards Pyongyang.” (H. 34) The persistence of collapse scenarios in U.S. foreign policy thinking and the pursuance of denuclearization and demilitarization as diplomatic objectives without economic headway strengthens the position of hawks and neo-cons against opening North Korea economically, and the habit of the U.S. of reneging on or the slow implementation of diplomatic and economic promises seriously corrodes the leverage of the liberal group in Pyongyang. (Petrov) Both of these outcomes serve to deepen the economic isolation of North Korea, and endanger the likelihood of disarmament talks even as negotiations progress. One of the possible ways of circumventing the staunch position of the Old Guard is through the “second economy,” created by Kim Jong Il. By sidestepping the official economic bureaucracy and setting up an extensive network of trade firms headed by powerful military leaders loyal to Kim, the recognition of the need for economic revival among North Korean leadership, as well as the opportunity for personal profit, has garnered significant military support for progressive foreign economic policy. (H. 38)

So far the pragmatists in Pyongyang have been able to grasp the benefits of economic liberalization and a place in the global economy but what reforms have been implemented have principally found their genesis within North Korea with little encouragement from abroad, which along with the trade barriers still applied by the U.S. prevents North Korea from truly enjoying these benefits. Facilitation by the United States in terms of funding and cooperation is paramount in ensuring the continuation of North Korea’s economic reforms, both domestic and international. For the U.S. to place an economic stake and offer its guidance in the recovery of North Korea, it would dash the contentions of the bureaucratic Old Guard and empower pragmatists and reformers by virtually eliminating fears of failure. Also, once the U.S. government is involved in North Korea and the risk of doing business there is abated the floodgates will be open for private American investment, and in turn private capital from all over the globe would increase exponentially. American business is well known for being driven by developing markets and while North Korea cannot be expected to lose its basis in a command economy, the opportunity to get in on the “ground floor” of a rapidly expanding market in North Korea would be too lucrative of a possible investment for many entrepreneurs to pass up, and indeed a small group of Westerners have already taken the risks of doing business there. (McDonald)

The patent benefits of foreign investment are numerous, which would prove the potential of liberalization to D.P.R.K. leadership, as well as stimulate North Korea’s economic recovery. Successful progressive policies would have other far-reaching and not strictly economic by-products, not the least of which a great improvement in the standard of living of ordinary North Koreans, as well as providing a new source of national pride for North Korea and helping to disentangle the notion of honor and sovereignty being directly tied to the military and associated weapons programs. New industries would be able to form and North Korea could likely find itself on the road to prosperity in a similar manner as that of South Korea; the simultaneous opening up to South Korea’s allies in the United States and Japan would reflect the South’s Nordpolitik of the late eighties, a Südpolitik if you will, in encouraging normalization between the two countries. While cultural import would obviously be kept in check by the D.P.R.K. the end of economic isolation will naturally allow for a greater amount of foreign ideas and products to flow into North Korea, possibly counteracting some of the effects of indoctrination so heavily emphasized by the regime. Maintaining its control will certainly be one of the highest priorities of the D.P.R.K. while economic reform is in motion but the success of these programs will lend a legitimacy and credibility to the government that it has yet to accumulate through other means, helping to dispell North Korean fears of disintegration. A renovation of their international stature and increased channels of legitimate revenue will devalue North Korea’s reliance on weapons sales, involvement in illicit trade, “extortionomics” and associated nuclear and missile programs, which underlines the fact that a transformation originating within North Korea would nonetheless fulfill our security concerns.

Economic Engagement in Practice

The second arm of a new overarching diplomatic policy, along with U.S. demilitarization, would be based on adopting a broad and flexible format of engagement through which to initiate North Korea’s economic recovery and promote its reform. The idea requires a fundamental change in our relationship with North Korea, our foreign policy methodology, and our priorities on the peninsula. First and foremost, the normalization of relations between Washington and Pyongyang is necessary before anything further can be accomplished and the methods below operate on the assumption that they would be conducted simultaneously with, or following the relaxation of military tensions in Korea. Like South Korea we must forge a narrative of peace with the North and gain their trust, which would begin by replacing the ceasefire machinery with a peace agreement. The United States must offer full and continual diplomacy to North Korea, not as a bargaining chip and especially not only after North Korea provides international provocation that threatens regional security. In our deliberations with North Korea we must find a balance between demands and incentives that is realistic, not arrogant. Engagement is not merely a channel through which to make our demands of the D.P.R.K.; effective and mutually beneficial engagement is not an end, but a gateway. In order to make this kind of engagement work the U.S. will need to alter its role on the Korean peninsula, or at least in the way that it is perceived. In its current state the D.P.R.K. sees the United States, South Korea, and Japan primarily as a menacing anti-North Korean conglomerate. U.S. diplomats must make a concerted effort to show our goodwill and our commitment to mediating regional tensions, by no means becoming anti-South or excessively pro-North, but to move towards the middle. Part of this perspective on North Korea’s part comes from the close relationship between American and South Korean armed forces, which will probably not change until our redeployment or disengagement from the peninsula, as well as the transference of U.N. (essentially U.S.) command of forces back to South Korea. It will also be important to get regional powers all working towards North Korean recovery if the D.P.R.K. is to be fully integrated into the economy of Northeast Asia.

The close relationship between U.S.-D.P.R.K. relations and the internal political struggle in North Korea is something Washington needs to recognize and harness as well. The best way to engage with and empower reform-minded officials within Pyongyang would be to release North Korea from heavy sanctions and trade barriers, prepare a new aid package with a focus on improving infrastructure, and fashion as many official economic ties as possible. The U.S. would be served well in this endeavor by the presence of numerous natural resources found in North Korea and the relative ease with which they could be mobilized provided that the industrial and transportation infrastructure is upgraded. The high probability of large untapped oil reserves is a potential windfall for North Korea, not only for the foreign earnings they would gain but also due to the near constant fuel shortage they have suffered since the end of the Cold War. (H. 52) We should continue the trend set by Kim Jong Il in the 1998 constitution of deemphasizing “independent development,” stressing international ties and allowing juche to evolve into a concept more akin to Japan’s kokutai, or “national essence,” with which it already shares certain themes, or its historical meaning of “body of the monarch.” (H. 16) All of these measures would help to lower the trouble and risk associated with doing business in North Korea and help to attract foreign capital. (McDonald) It is also important, however, to leave room for additional incentives for cooperation from the D.P.R.K. As O’Hanlon and Mochizuki attest, “the right incentives are not bribes; they are catalysts to reform.” (O. 16) Continued engagement is important in both fortifying pragmatists in Pyongyang in their struggle against military hard-liners and allowing reform to gain momentum and more popular support. (Harrison) If our facilitation is able to tip the scales in favor of the pragmatists and reformers in North Korea, our currently dwindling diplomatic options may become a host of new opportunities, and a peaceful and prosperous Northeast Asia more assured.

Bibliography:

“DPRK Foreign Ministry Clarifies Stand on New Measure to Bolster War Deterrent.” October 3rd, 2006. Korean Central News Agency. 3 May 2009.

Harrison, Selig S. Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Unification and U.S. Disengagement. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.

Harrison, Selig S. “North Korea, the US and the Bottom Line in Negotiating the Future.” Japan Focus. 21 February 2009. The Asia-Pacific Journal. 3 May 2009.

Lankov, Andrei. “Sanctions Will Have No Effect on North Korea.” Policy Forum Online. April 23rd, 2009. Nautilus Institute. 3 May 2009.
Article

McDonald, Joe. “North Korea Is ‘Hungry for Business’,” ABC News International from Associated Press, Beijing, 5 November 2006.

O’Hanlon, Michael and Mike Mochizuki. Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003.

Petrov, Leonid. “Neo-Cons in Pyongyang.” Policy Forum Online. November 18th, 2008. Nautilus Institute. 3 May 2009.
Article


Richter, Paul and John M. Glionna. “North Korea says 'never again' to nuclear talks.” Los Angeles Times. April 15th, 2009. 3 May 2009.

1.01.2000

Capstone Project

Viewing Post-War Japanese Culture Through Modern and Contemporary Art

In this survey I would like to investigate contemporary Japanese cultural and historical identity as manifest in the words and work of two prominent Japanese artists, for whom issues concerning national ethos are major themes. I’ve selected the visual artist Takashi Murakami who in the last ten years has made a splash in the international art scene with his distinctive, highly stylized graphics and dynamic marketability, and Nobel laureate of literature Kenzaburo Oe whose prolific career has spanned from the immediate postwar to the present. Oe and Murakami have expressed strong opinions about the predicament of Japan’s postwar culture, which is currently a widespread theme in literature concerning Japan both by Japanese and foreign scholars. In order to properly analyze their responses as to the genesis and consequences of this perceived deficiency it is necessary to first understand the cultural movements to which each artist belongs and how they inform differing conceptions of Japan.

Oe aligns himself with the school of junbungaku, or “serious literature.” This literary method enjoys a lineage concurrent with Japan’s modernization that stretches back to the Meiji era in which intellectuals rejected the established literary tradition and began to absorb Western literature. By combining a strong influence from abroad with their scholarship of Chinese classics they endeavored to construct narratives that could give Japanese a contemporary identity in an international context. During the prewar and war years that were defined by the emergence of militarism this kind of literature was suppressed and latent junbungaku writers could only distinguished themselves through the study of European literature. With the end of the war freedom of expression was reclaimed and these young intellectuals immediately produced a flurry of activity, inspired by Japan’s aggression and defeat to search for a new place in the world wholly apart from prewar aspirations. They broke from the autobiographical style of the then-popular “I-novel” and adopted a fundamentally existential worldview, and weren’t afraid to merge sex and politics with the realm of high literature. [1] They reevaluated Japanese modernity, looking towards Okinawan and Korean models as successful mergers of traditional and imported cultures. They also sought to bridge the considerable chasms between Japan and the West, as well as third world countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. To Oe the marvel of postwar literature represents the acme of modern Japanese literature and he models his identity as a writer on preserving the heritage of this group.

Comprised of intellectuals writing for intellectuals, junbungaku and the postwar school consciously occupied a unique station outside the realm of mass-produced, morally vacuous culture, which Oe denotes as popular and mundane. [2] Effectively self-marginalized, this writing initially survived on the basis of an intellectually engaged readership, but as the impoverished postwar years gave way to the era of recovery and in turn remarkable economic growth the demand for high literature steadily waned. Oe provides the example of the five existent literary monthlies who rely on producing a large volume of “sheer entertainment” in order to remain commercially viable. “The number of serious literary works,” according to Oe, “has decreased as the number of other publications has continued to grow.” [3] Indeed in 1995 forty percent of books and magazines sold in Japan was constituted by manga alone. [4] For Oe, this inability of junbungaku to resist being overpowered by frivolous entertainment is an ominous harbinger of a culture losing its vitality. He imagines, “a scenario in which Japanese culture, after losing the capacity to create a human model for the future, withers and dies, leaving behind nothing that moves but a few objects like cars, TVs, and microcomputers.” [5]

While commenting on these economic factors, he also indicts the generation of young intellectuals that succeeded his own. Unlike their predecessors who were involved in and informed the movements in the 1960s protesting such things as the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control, this new generation had become more conservative and decidedly apolitical. They did retain the intellectual predilection for European culture but instead of internalizing foreign concepts in an effort to develop domestic cultural narratives they merely consumed one theory after another, or as Oe puts it, “accepted” and “discharged,” them until flow of these ideas concluded. [6] This method of transplantation never allowed imported cultural theories to be evaluated in the context of Japanese society and combined with the lack of engagement with postwar ideals led to the failure of the intellectuals in the 1970s and 80s to develop a cultural theory of their own. Oe goes so far as to say that they were not genuine intellectuals, “but merely young Japanese following a subcultural fad that swept through an average, urban consumer society.”[7] Oe could only look on as an increasingly disinterested youth becomes captivated by passing cultural trends and at the same time overlooks the loss of their best method of critically investigating the state of Japanese society and forming models for their future. The inability of the postwar school to survive in a growing climate of conformity has not however interrupted Oe from pursing, with literature as his torch, “ways to be of some use in the cure and reconciliation of mankind.” [8]

Subculture, on the other hand, has come to define Murakami’s inspiration and aesthetic sensibility. In the 1960s the leveling of incomes coupled with the explosion of home television set ownership found local customs losing out to a popular culture, promulgated by a homogenized media environment. [9] This in turn allowed for the widespread proliferation of pop culture, especially in the form of children’s programming, subculturally joining young people on a nationwide scale and effectively swelling the generation gap to an unprecedented level. Early incarnations of the growing subculture took form in popular forms such as anime, tokusatsu, literally “special effects,” or what we would equate with monster movies in the vein of Godzilla and television programs like Power Rangers, science fiction, as well as manga, though over time the passion and faithfulness of audiences known as otaku transformed these genres in unprecedented ways. As this generation reached adulthood in the 1980s its infatuation with these elements rendered it unfamiliar to previous generations and to some degree repulsive; it might be seen as no accident that this coincided with Oe’s bemoaned sidelining of intellectual pursuit. This alienation and ensuing antinomy between generations is the struggle underlying the formation of a new class of self-imposed outcasts, the otaku.

Etymologically otaku finds its origins in a society where individuals, especially within the family unit, are increasingly isolated from one another. By the “rapid growth” era of the 1960s husbands spent most of their time at work, and indeed it could be said that they found a more traditionally fulfilling role in the family of the workplace. [10] Fierce competition for academic advancement encouraged parents to send their children to after-hour cram schools, in which seventy percent of schoolchildren had enrolled by the mid-1970s, [11] and wives and mothers found themselves quarantined in the home. Literally translating to “your home,” neighborhood women used this term as an honorific for one another, the main source of their identity lying in the material space of the household, [12] and entered the vocabulary of their children who had a similarly isolated contact with their peers.

While the cultural origins can be traced back to the abounding subcultures of a homogenized youth, developing a fundamental definition of otaku is a nebulous and ultimately futile affair; new generations of otaku continue to transform the way they define themselves and generation gaps exist even within this subculture. Marked by an emphasis on personal taste and obsession, perhaps the most accurate translation would be “fanboy,” but the otaku’s uncanny trust in the utopia of their fantasies and practice of identifying themselves through self-marginalization that is evocative though in an altogether different spirit than that of the postwar school—in a society where conformity is considered essential to national wellbeing—makes them an infinitely more deviant variety. From their beginnings in sci-fi fandom otaku have shared a love of subcultural phenomena that are arch, experimental, of high quality and in pursuit of an overarching Eros. In each genre a hierarchy has evolved based on the inexhaustible accumulation of detail and debate, the ultimate goal to become an “otaku king,” something Murakami failed to do, and this derailment one factor in his decision to become an artist. [13] This behavior seems perhaps stereotypical of Japanese commitment and technical fixation but due to their immateriality of focus and devotion to fantasy otaku inevitably became alienated from the mainstream. Unable to truly escape the society that discriminated against them, otaku fell deeper into the rabbit-hole of their subcultural obsessions. Aware that otaku were their most zealous audience and critic, creators of manga and anime maintained high standards of production and thematically these products became increasingly complex. This intimate relationship between creator and consumer, along with their sizable knowledge of cultural artifacts led many young otaku to become themselves innovators in the fields of anime and manga. As the end of the 1980s approached, this generation saw, in the bursting of the “bubble economy,” what was their dream of a utopian future crashing down, and could explain the subsequent increases of apocalyptic themes and imagery in the subculture of the 1990s. Since then otaku have become increasingly diverse and ambiguous, ranging from model-tank builders to erotic toy aficionados to creators of their own amateur manga who flock to the biannual Comiket comic convention in the hundreds of thousands. This diversity of mentality and taste continues to the extent that one of the few remaining qualities of all otaku is the willingness to pursue their fantasies at the cost of social rejection, bound in an ahistorical paralysis. As both the consumers and producers of their culture, the otaku have been able to sustain their peripheral existence and in the process substantiated the critical assessment of subculture in Japan, an essential step towards the emergence of Neo Pop, the springboard from which Murakami launched his Superflat movement.

Twice in modern history Japan has played a frantic game of economic and technological catch-up with the West, as well as in terms of politics and culture. As a consequence in the first instance an imperial Japan sets out to establish its empire in Asia, which inevitably comes to a head in the fifteen-year Pacific War, the outcome of which was a Japan demoralized by the violence it had inflicted in the war and suffered in defeat. In the second instance a newly democratized Japan fervently applies the American economic model in an effort to regain equal standing with Western nations. With all energies focused on recovery the prospect of financial rehabilitation soon gave way to the reality of spectacular growth. Having already equaled and surpassed many Western nations in building capital and financial infrastructure, when the economy stalled in the early nineties the Japanese finally had the chance to reflect on the last forty years of collective tunnel vision and wonder what it was they were working so hard to achieve. They found that in pursuing the American Dream they lost sight of the their own Japanese Dream and remain hard-pressed for a clear purpose in Japan’s modern landscape. The concept of wakon-yosai, translating literally to “Japanese spirit, Western knowledge,” has provided the ideological basis for Japanese modernization since the early restoration period. With so much of the contemporary Japanese way of life finding its origin outside of native tradition, the Japanese repeatedly find themselves grappling with a diffuse national identity and ambiguous place in the international community. This struggle comes to the fore in the work of Oe and Murakami, and as two of the most well known working Japanese artists both at home and abroad they have power to shape, and therefore share a responsibility for the representation of, the Japanese identity.

As a successor to the legacy of the postwar school of writers Oe has frankly professed his intention to produce literature distinct from, “reflections of the vast consumer culture of Tokyo and the subcultures of the world at large.” [14] One of the distinguishing qualities of these writers indicated by Oe is a desire for moral values to predominate over material concerns, a mark of junbungaku since its inception. He includes the example of Soseki deploring the “fierce appetites” of Japanese society stimulated by “a tidal wave that had swept from European shores,” along with their ignorance of European morality. [15] Though made almost one hundred years prior this example is an equally apt descriptor of contemporary Japan, only that it should seem moderate by comparison. The illustration is also relevant in that it demonstrates not only a sense of morality in the intellectuals of that time, but their association of that morality with an indigenous one preexisting modernization. Soseki believed that the balance between moral and material desires would only be restored once Japan had equal financial footing with Europe, but never imagined that day to come. The better part of a century later Japan has reached that stage of financial security; unfortunately the moral equilibrium has not been replaced but in fact progressed in the opposite direction, to what Oe calls a “state of outright spiritual poverty.” [16] In order to play a responsible role in international affairs, this moral deficit must be countered by a sense of morality both applicable to Western values and derived from pre-modern traditions, according to Oe. Ironically, the period of Japanese history that he equates with the highest level of intellectual interaction with moral issues coincides with the segment of history, between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the growth era in the sixties, that represents the greatest instance of poverty and privation in modern Japanese history.

Japan’s ambiguous international identity is in fact an amalgamation of the first and third world and yet resides properly in neither as Japan can neither embrace its identity as a third world nation nor demonstrate its status in the first; Oe defines this ambiguity as a, “kind of chronic disease that has been prevalent throughout the modern age.” [17] A serious repercussion of Japan’s ambiguity can be observed in its aggression towards other Asian nations during World War II and the preceding years, effectively driving a deep rift between Japan and its neighbors both politically and culturally, which continued antagonism has failed to assuage. That Japan has so often taken the role of aggressor against those nations, “among which it should count itself,” weighs heavily on Oe. [18] In the West Japan has also yet to fully liberate itself from its shadowy identity, not aided by Japan’s increasing competitiveness in global markets. Consider then the influence over Japan that the American government, as Japan’s principal trade partner and source of military protection, still holds. Japan’s ambiguity seems to be accelerating, and as a writer Oe looks for a ways to articulate this ambiguity for the Japanese people, that in self-reflection they might find a new life, “as an integral part of the third world, in Asia.” [19]

To Murakami, ambiguity is less of an issue; he has a clear idea of contemporary Japan, what he refers to as an “apocalyptic tragic paradise.” [20] As a child in the 1960s and 70s, Murakami could find little reality in the atrocities of war, as the images of which reached his generation through television images of the war and children’s programming. He was also too young to experience the passionate student movements that questioned and challenged postwar paradigms. For him Japan, humiliated and acquiescent in defeat, became a “greenhouse” of American-style democracy and capitalism without historical grounds and lacking autonomy, a system that does not produce ‘adults.’ [21] Murakami holds that compulsory implementation of the American model, along with the traumatization that stems from being the only nation on Earth to have suffered the horrific effects of nuclear war and fallout, produces a society with an infantile sensibility, and he is corroborated by Douglas MacAurthur likening Japan to, “a boy of twelve,” in an address to the United States Senate in 1951. [22]

This syndrome of immaturity repeatedly manifests itself in the Japanese popular culture produced for domestic consumption and lends itself to the export of Japanese cultural identity internationally. Since the 1960s anime has been a cornerstone of Japanese popular culture and along with the ubiquitous manga provides a readily available outlet for fantasy and escapism for the public at large. Based in drawing, these forms are able to depict impossible worlds as well as remain visually simplistic enough to allow the projection of ideas onto the images by the audience. [23] Adapted from a comic strip that began in 1946, the popular anime Sazae-san has been one of the most commercially successful ever produced and is the longest-running animated television series in history; it first aired in 1969 and continues to be produced today. Set in an ahistorical postwar Japan, Sazae-san portrays a traditionally outmoded family that includes three generations living in the same household and is characterized by their wholesome and customary family life. Its continual domination of television ratings betrays the attraction to a nostalgic and ideal past for the Japanese public and the function of its popular culture to supply these images. While they have by now left the world of “children’s programming,” and appeal to all age groups, narratives in anime and manga continue to focus on children and childhood dreams. An archetypical example of this is the anime series Doraemon, like most anime shows the animated adaptation of a popular manga series. It stars a “lovable loser” grade-schooler, a widespread character type, and a cat-like robot (robotics being another dominant media trope) from the future that has access to an assortment of fantastic technology, which is used in the resolution of the main character’s perpetual adolescent dilemmas. The level to which Japanese identify with this kind of show is revealed by the actions of Japan’s foreign minister, who in 2008 appointed the titular robot cat as “anime ambassador” as well as arranged showings of the cartoon in Japanese diplomatic missions in numerous countries around the world. [24] While evident of Japan’s endeavors to harness its “soft power,” it also presents a somehow naive image of how the Japanese identify themselves in their culture and how they present themselves through that culture to the international community. The attention that Japanese popular culture gives to childlike dreams of the future and nostalgic visions of the past leads many young people, as they approach adulthood, to feel betrayed by the constricting reality of a Japanese society that possesses neither a widespread progressive movement or strong sense of traditional values. This impetus to further submerge themselves into the realm of the imagination often culminates in an otaku sensibility or its more socially worrisome analog, hikikomori. Literally “pulling in and retiring,” hikikomori are those who have socially and physically withdrawn from society, rarely leaving their rooms or communicating with others, including their parents. [25]

If Doraemon is Japan’s “anime ambassador,” then kawaii is his entourage. “Cute” culture emerged in the 1970s and by the 1980s had become a dominant cultural theme. Fueled by widespread affluence and the targeting of young girls as an opportune market in a rampant consumerist society, kawaii culture and its paraphernalia effectively supported a lifestyle that could be called the female version of otaku, one that prized collectibility and pathos, and emphasized the private space of the individual. The idea of kawaii in its most commercial sense is perhaps best embodied by “character goods,” the most instantly recognizable of which is Hello Kitty, that have no identity or narrative but exist simply as a promotion of any manifestation of the products they happen to be on, of which there are a seemingly infinite variety. In 2003 alone, the Hello Kitty line, which includes approximately fifty thousand products sold around the world, generated close to a billion dollars in sales for Sanrio. [26] This method of ubiquitous and meaningless branding is another theme explored by Murakami on an artistic, as well as commercial level, discussed further below. Another offshoot of kawaii culture is the phenomenon of yuru chara. Roughly translating as “pathetic characters” but free of negative overtones, yuru chara are essentially life-sized mascots created by municipalities to commemorate a specific event or advertise local tourism and are often inspire their own line of merchandise. To Murakami they, “stand in for the Japanese themselves,” representatives of an immature and impotent culture. Oe once used the analogy of denouement in the novel, as a way of finding new interpretations through the illumination of previously grasped truth, to explain the effect of the defeat of Japan on interpreting its hitherto stunted attempts at modernization. [27] Murakami coincidentally also chooses the same word in his assessment of modern Japan, but as a caustic remonstration of a comatose society.

Murakami himself admits a propensity, “to immerse myself in thinking and talking about things in the fantasy world that have no role in society whatsoever,” [28] that shapes his identity as an otaku, and though his meditations on Japanese history and aesthetics are equally apparent in the array of his professional ambitions, he felt constrained by his subcultural identity as an artist in Japan. Drawing a parallel with the hinin, or outcasts of pre-modern Japan that worked as entertainers, Murakami asserts that otaku have taken up this role of pariah in contemporary Japanese society. Originally scorned for their obsession with what the mainstream perceived as entertainment for children, anime and manga have since become hugely profitable enterprises that appeal to the mainstream, even some of those produced with a distinctly otaku bent. The term mania has also come into popular use and, from the English maniac, has come to refer to those with similar tastes as otaku but remain socially well-adjusted and don’t project the same aura of distaste.

In 1989 the almost instinctual aversion felt by the general populace who were aware of otaku was intensified on a national level, and to many validated, by the arrest of Tsutomu Miyazaki, a pervert and the murderer of four little girls. The ensuing images of his room broadcast on Japanese television showed an extensive videotape collection, consisting largely of horror and anime films, and was deemed by the media an ‘otaku space.’ Commenting on the discrimination of otaku following the media frenzy, Murakami recalls that, “it was just like my room,” as well as the rooms of all his friends, only they weren’t psychopathic. [29] The situation was not improved when in 1995 the Aum Shinrikyo religious cult carried out an attack with sarin gas on the Tokyo subway system resulting in twelve deaths with many more seriously injured, some permanently. Aum’s connection to otaku were numerous, including subculture references in their promotional literature, a storefront in the otaku-frequented Akihabara shopping district, and their guiding prophetic doctrine, which was a rehashing of various Armageddon fantasies that proliferated in otaku culture. The indiscriminate act of terrorism shocked Japan, and when the public learned of Aum’s otaku leanings it triggered what Murakami remembers as, “a media bonanza,” and otaku were soon relegated even further from mainstream society as something completely unfathomable. [30] Despite all this otaku continue to proliferate; in 2006 there were an estimated 2.85 Japanese living as otaku. [31] As prevalent as they have become the social stigma has begun to evaporate yet, “they remain unable to the shed the air of the grotesque,” and Murakami sees fit to record their struggle as a significant portion of the population that is both discriminated against yet undeniably integrated into society as an indication of the current situation of Japan. [32]

Though Murakami employs a familiar aesthetic and adheres to otaku-esque principles of quality and concept that does not necessarily mean that otaku readily embrace or appreciate his work. As a self-styled otaku historian Murakami in effect becomes their mirror and spokesperson, both challenging their sensibilities and piquing their self-consciousness. Author and lecturer on otaku studies Toshio Okada reacts to Murakami’s collectible figurine shokugan by comparing it to those that accompany a weekly manga, “their work is more creative, whereas your shokugan are very commercial,” and that the manga’s figurines appeal to him more as “art.” [33] Estranged from the art scene in Japan and not recognized as a true purveyor of otaku culture, Murakami acknowledged that what he was trying to create was, “neither commercially acceptable nor sustainable in Japan,” and consequently departed for America, where his work was more readily embraced. [34] Murakami’s transition from the Japanese to the global art market allowed his work to enter the critical discourse of “fine art” and enabled him to both diversify the nature of his craft and pursue the concepts that would ultimately form the Superflat philosophy. Merging into western art history he did not eschew comparisons to American Pop but is plain in differentiating contemporary Japanese art: “the formatting of pop as a context has finally finished,” forty years after its American version, “and the reconstruction of the culture is just starting.” [35] Outside of Japan Murakami is able to produce art that is distinctly Japanese that at the same time is not derived from within the constructs of contemporary Japanese society, which empowers him to make a compelling critique of that society in an international context.

Since the postwar began Japanese society has come to encompass a multitude of intertwined paradoxes, a large contribution of which stem directly from the war and its aftereffects. To this day the most contentious part of the Constitution of Japan, unaltered since its ratification in 1947, has been Article 9, which renounces Japan’s right to wage war or maintain an armed service. However, the Self Defense Forces, while legally identified as an extension of the national police force its constitutionality has regularly been question and the presence of any armed force in Japan continues to wear on the Japanese conscience. On the other hand many perceive the vision of “peace” bestowed on the Japanese as a fabrication itself due to the continued presence of U.S. military bases in Japan, the nuclear arms race of the Cold War era, and Japan being forced to navigate international pressures during both Gulf Wars. Another dimension of this paradoxical identity is the cycle of death and rebirth. With a higher death rate than birth rate Japan must soon address the realities of an aging society, especially that of a looming labor crisis. At the same time many young people, when confronted with the necessity of sacrificing personal realization and the demanding social, educational, and professional environments of a traditionally successful life are simply refusing that option, sometimes in favor of a hermetic existence. As this whirlwind of self-contradictions begins to loosen the spiritual moorings of “rapid growth” and a consumer-based culture the Japanese are in a decisive position to conduct a personal reevaluation of the ambiguous Japanese Dream. Oe and Murakami have developed two distinct templates for coping with this ambiguity, and while neither one claims to have cracked the code of Japanese uniqueness, they both speak with urgency and purpose.

Oe refers to this ambiguity as a destructive force, one that divides Japan and isolates it from its neighbors, yet one he carries around with him, “like a deep-felt scar.” [36] Literature, however, allows him a vehicle for spiritual recovery and inspiration. For Oe, writing about his personal traumas and surviving them are one in the same. It is significant that he illustrates his fundamental method of writing about, “society, the state, and the world in general,” as consistently grounded in his personal struggles, providing a basis for interpreting his novels that is human and relatable. [37] His personal identity being irretrievably associated with the periphery of society, Oe uses the methodology of grotesque realism to entertain his ambitions of universality: depicting the indivisibility of the body, society and the cosmos and leveling all that is ideal or transcendental with the physical earth and body. [38] In pursuing the comedy and humanity of this technique his voice often becomes that of a clown, and indeed Oe insists that that is the job of the writer, to be, “the clown who also talks about sorrow, ” [39] and thus like the Shakespearean fool offer insight into unfortunate actualities under the guise of foolishness. Oe is also a determined practitioner of “cultural negation,” portraying the peripheral as a means of sidestepping the constructs of “official” culture and in turn relegating the center to the margin. He utilizes this negation in creating his own mythology, one that focuses not on the Emperor but the gods who were chased into the forest upon the Emperor’s arrival, forming an alternate mythic history of Japan. In a way this is Oe’s method of maintaining the ideals of the postwar school, the writers of which in that brief and unprecedented period of time were able to “relativize” the Emperor System in their search for new models of living. [40] In Oe’s view the Emperor is neither a symbol of Japanese identity or the center of his worldview, instead he is a catalyst for the Japanese people to forget themselves and their responsibility for a collective history and inasmuch, “what has been suppressing the arts and the minds of the masses.” [41] Oe is deeply troubled by the unchecked spread of a nationalism based on the nostalgia for a largely invented history. This new nationalism, in its urge to amend Article 9, threatens the survival of the Japanese people’s self-determination and also the, “permanent peace as the moral basis for their rebirth,” in the wake of the catastrophe of war. [42]

For Murakami, the more paradoxes that emerge and compound each other, the more meaningless Japan’s “journey of self-discovery” becomes, [43] and it is necessary to follow the chaotic progress of the “real” in contemporary Japan in order to plot a course for the future. After World War II’s catastrophic end, the Japanese initiated their own retreat from reality by effectively prescribing amnesia in regards to the lingering nightmares of the atrocities committed at home and abroad. Such a powerful and complex memory would not stay buried, however, and began to materialize in pop culture, like the not-so-subtle allegory of Godzilla, and the anime subculture of the post-1960s aimed at children. Channeling repressed memories of war and the continuing anxiety of nuclear eradication, subculture came to be the de facto incubator of the reality of Japan’s fictionalized past in an era when fine art rarely breached the subject. However distorted and exaggerated, the truth survived in children’s tales, and Murakami correlates the birth of the otaku sensibility with its recognition of these storytellers. [44] After the extinction of the postwar junbungaku school Japan would become a virtual desert of artistic intellectual discourse on the war and recovery until its reemergence in the early 1990s in the form of Tokyo Pop. Co-opting both Japan’s distorted sense of history and kawaii culture in disturbing juxtaposition, this movement of young artists grew up in a Japan flooded with subculture, which they claimed for their own in a visual representation of Japan’s paradoxical history.

However, the borrowing of Pop to describe this new and wholly Japanese generation of artists never sat right with Murakami, the, “theme of Pop was too narrow to comprehensively explain postwar Japanese culture.” [45] And so the idea for a new theory to describe contemporary Japanese culture swirled in Murakami’s mind, until the chance phrase of a sales pitch by an L.A. gallerist gave it life: “How about this painting? It’s super flat, super high quality, and super clean!” [46] Hearing a fundamental, if bizarre, truth in these words, Murakami found his descriptor for Japan’s art and culture. Reminiscent of Oe’s grotesque realism, Superflat not only described the physical surfaces of his paintings, but a leveling—of past, present, and future, high and low culture, craft and merchandise. Bijutsu, the fine arts, was installed in Japan in 1873 in order to meet with Western standards of modernity, whereas up until that point there has been no hierarchical difference between art forms, whether painting or ornamentation. It is Murakami’s hope that the Japanese “passion to decorate” will rid itself of the constrictions of “pure art” and redefine Japanese art. [47] Manga’s ancestry also predates Japan’s modernization and another function of Superflat is to validate Japanese art history in its various subcultural forms over the past fifty years. In this way Murakami constructs a lineage from nihonga, a traditionalist school of painting formed in reaction to modernization, through manga, anime and Japanese Neo Pop to the present day. He is essentially following Oe’s guideline for constructing a new moral direction but in the most cultural practice of art, establishing a theory that, “can be shared with Western nations but that, for its own purposes, is firmly founded on the traditions of Japan's premodern period.” [48] In light of this, Murakami also applies his leveling effect to the dichotomy of high art and merchandising, his desire to reach a mass audience necessitates a move outside the museum or gallery space. [49] With a full staff behind him Murakami produces a huge assortment of knick-knacks that have even made their way back to the otaku shops in Japan, though as we’ve seen, are considered “very commercial.” Perhaps the most striking example of this crossover is Murakami’s 2003 collaboration with Marc Jacobs on a Louis Vuitton series that merged their brand potential with incredible success. In that year alone the sales reached $300 million, [50] in part due to Murakami’s ability to distill fifty years of Japanese anime and his entire body of work into a single, recognizable symbol, indeed he has found an, “effective medium to survive cheerfully,” [51] whatever lies ahead in Japan’s future.

From the moment Japan began the long journey towards modernization, it has faced the problem of transforming itself in the likeness of Western nations while at the same time preserving what was fundamentally Japanese, and if to continue on this path is equivalent to sacrificing the latter to make way for the former, the essence of what is historically Japanese has eroded to the point of becoming nearly indecipherable. For contemporary Japanese society to successfully contend with what amounts to a national existential crisis and still remain a modern state, finding a model rooted in their past is not an option; neither can try to interpret their reflection in the eyes of the West, they must look inside themselves, as Oe and Murakami have and continue to do, and take the next step as if it were their first.

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